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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The issue of which financial initial conditions are necessary to materialize the 
benefits of financial globalization remains open to debate in the literature. In this paper, we try to 
put some empirical structure on the concept of financial threshold conditions in order to give 
policymakers guidance on the Kose et al. (2011) and Henry (2007) hypothesis. Its object is to 
assess if financial benefits of financial globalization are questionable until greater domestic 
financial development has taken place in African countries. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – In framing the financial dimension in a more concrete and 
tractable manner, we examine the concerns of how domestic financial initial dynamics of depth 
(economic and financial systems), efficiency (banking and financial systems), activity (banking 
and financial systems) and size, play out in the financial development benefits of financial 
globalization. The estimation approach consists of assessing the impact of financial globalization 
through-out the conditional distributions of domestic financial development dynamics.   
 
Findings – The introduction of previously missing financial dimensions into the debate 
generates a number of important findings. Only financial initial (threshold) conditions of size are 
necessary to materialize the benefits of financial globalization. While financial depth only 
partially validates the hypothesis, dynamics of efficiency and activity (credit) do not confirm the 
hypothesis. 
 
Practical implications – Addressing the issue of surplus liquidity in African financial 
institutions could improve the benefits of financial size and potentially reverse the trends of 
financial efficiency and activity. Depending on the context of sampled countries, the appropriate 
role of policy has always been either to stem the tide of capital flows or encourage them. 
Policymakers who have been viewing their challenges exclusively from the latter perspective for 
benefits in growth (finance) might be getting the financial dynamics badly wrong.  
 
Originality/value – Blanket financial development policies may not reap the financial benefits 
of financial globalization until domestic financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size 
are critically considered. The introduction of the last three previously missing components in the 
literature sheds more light on the globalization-development nexus.  
 
JEL Classification: F02; F21; F30; F40; O10 
Keywords:  Banking; International investment; Financial integration; Development 
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1. Introduction  
 
 Recent advances in the theoretical and empirical literatures indicate that the benefits of 
financial integration may be questionable until greater domestic financial and institutional 
developments have taken place. A new framework for analyzing financial globalization 
highlights the tension between the indirect benefits of financial integration and the potential risks 
if a country opens up to capital flows without the right initial conditions in place (Kose et al., 
2011). From a practical perspective, a reasonable evaluation of the cost-benefit trade-off requires 
a better insight into what these initial conditions are and how exactly they matter. This is an 
essential component of an analytical framework that can take account of country-specific 
features and initial conditions in designing a pragmatic approach to capital account liberalization 
at the advent of globalization (Prasad & Rajan, 2008).  
 The financial crisis has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial 
globalization and its implications for financial development especially in developing countries. 
The worldwide financial crisis has dramatically driven  home the downside of financial 
globalization, as many  emerging markets and developing economies had to grapple with surges 
in capital flows earlier in the last decade and then experienced a sharp reversal of those inflows 
at the height of the crisis (Kose et al., 2011). Financial linkages have served as a channel for the 
global financial turmoil and economic downturn to reach their shores. This has re-ignited the 
fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization and its implications for growth and 
volatility, especially for developing countries. In theory, however, financial globalization should 
facilitate efficient international allocation of capital and promote international risk sharing. 
Though these benefits should be much greater for developing countries
1
, the issues of which 
                         
1
 Developing countries are relatively capital scarce and labor rich, so access to foreign capital should help them 
increase investment and growth. More so, developing countries have more volatile output than advanced industrial 
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financial initial conditions are necessary to materialize the benefits of financial globalization 
remains open to debate in the literature (Henry, 2007).  
 The recent wave of financial globalization started in the mid-1980s with rising cross-
border financial flows among industrial economies and between developing countries. This was 
spurred by liberalization of capital controls in many of these countries, in anticipation of the 
benefits that cross-border flows would bring in terms of better global capital allocation and 
improved possibilities of international risk-sharing. The strong presumption was that these 
benefits ought to be large, especially for developing countries that tend to be relatively capital-
poor and have more volatile income growth (Kose et al., 2006). With the surge in financial 
flows, came a spate of currency and financial turmoils in the late 1980s and 1990s. There is a 
widely held perception that developing countries opening-up to capital flows have been more 
vulnerable to these crises (and more adversely affected) than industrial countries. These 
developments have sparked a fierce debate among both academics and practitioners on the costs 
and benefits of capital account openness. The debate has intensified and become more polarized 
over time; in contrast to the debate on trade liberalization, which has more or less tilted towards 
a consensus (Kose et al., 2006).  
Some proponents view increasing capital account liberalization and unfettered capital 
flows as a serious impediment to global financial stability (Rodrik, 1998; Bhagwati, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2000), leading to calls for capital controls and the imposition of frictions, such as “Tobin 
taxes” on international asset trade. Others argue that, increased openness to capital flows has to a 
great extent proven essential for countries aiming to upgrade from lower to middle-income 
status, while significantly enhancing stability among industrialized countries (Fischer, 1998; 
                                                                               
economies, which makes their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing much greater (Kose et al., 
2011).  
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Summers, 2000). This is evidently a matter of considerable policy relevance, especially with 
major economies like China and India recently taking steps to open-up their capital accounts. 
Thus, this lends credit to the view that empirical literature is gradually tilting towards supporting 
a significant positive role for financial globalization, though there are many unanswered 
questions about how a country should organize and pace its move.  
 In this paper, we try to put some empirical structure on the concept of financial threshold 
conditions in order to give policymakers guidance on the issue. We assess the concerns of how 
financial dynamic initial conditions of depth, efficiency, activity and size play out in the benefits 
of financial globalization. Thus, for each financial dynamic we investigate if the benefits (ills) of 
financial globalization are different across the conditional distributions of financial development. 
Our main contribution is the introduction of previously missing financial components in the 
liberalization-finance debate. Therefore, we examine the Kose et al., (2011) and Henry (2007) 
hypotheses
2
 in the light of new financial dimensions. Threshold initial conditions from our 
findings could ease policy guidance on the debate. Particularly on the issue of which financial 
initial conditions are necessary to materialize the benefits of financial globalization, a concern 
open to debate in the literature (Henry, 2007)
3
.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We 
begin in Section 2 by reviewing some conflicts in existing literature. We position the current 
paper in the context of the debate in Section 3. In Section 4, we tackle the measurement and 
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 “In this paper we develop a unified empirical framework for characterizing such threshold conditions. We find that 
there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality: the cost-
benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once these threshold conditions are satisfied” (Kose 
et al., 2011, p.1).  
3
 “Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 1990s, a more calibrated 
approach has been followed in the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This 
approach is consistent with the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account 
liberalization for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging economies. Evidence suggests that the 
greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. Benefits 
resulting from external debt flows are questionable until greater domestic financial market development has taken 
place” (Henry, 2007). 
 
 5 
methodological issues. Empirical analysis and discussion are covered in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Conflicts in the literature 
  
 The decision to move from a closed account regime (where capital may not move freely 
in and out of the country) and liberalize capital accounts (in which capital can enter and leave at 
will) is not without controversy. From a broad perspective, there are two starkly different views 
about the wisdom of capital account liberalization as a policy choice for developing countries. 
 In the first strand, ‘allocation efficiency’ draws heavily on the predictions of the standard 
neoclassical growth model pioneered by Robert M. Solow (1956). In the neoclassical model, 
liberalizing the capital account eases a more efficient international allocation of resources and 
produces all kinds of salubrious effects. Resources flow from capital abundant developed 
countries where the return of capital is low, to capital-scarce developing countries where the 
return of capital is high. The flow of resources into the developing countries reduces their cost of 
capital, triggering a temporal increase in investment and growth that permanently raises their 
living standards (Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000). Partially 
motivated by the prospective gains from incorporating allocating efficiency arguments into their 
economic policies, dozens of developing countries from Santiago to Seoul implemented some 
form of financial liberalization during the past quarter century.  
 The alternative strand view’s ‘allocation efficiency’ as a fanciful attempt to extend the 
results on the gains from international trade in goods to international trade in assets. The 
predictions of ‘allocation efficiency’ stand ground only when the economy suffers from no 
distortions other than barriers to free capital flows. Owing to many distortions in developing 
countries, skeptics argue that the theoretical predictions of the neoclassical model bear little 
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resemblance to the reality of capital account policy. Provocative titles like “Who Needs Capital- 
Account Convertibility?” (before the turn of the century) and “Why Did Financial Globalization 
Disappoint?” (a decade after) by Rodrik (1998) and Rodrik & Subramanian (2009) respectively, 
best characterize this view. Rodrik (1998) find no correlation between the openness of countries’ 
capital accounts and the amount they invest or the rate at which they grow. He concludes that the 
benefits of open capital account (if indeed they exist) are not really apparent, but that the costs 
are manifestly evident in the form of recurrent emerging-market crises. Sodrik & Subramanian 
(2009) conclude that, in the wake of the sub-prime financial crisis, the claims that recent 
financial engineering has generated large gains are sounding less plausible. Hence, domestic 
finance maybe under closer scrutiny.  
On the international front, even leaving financial crises aside, it appears increasingly 
clear that the benefits of financial globalization are hard to find
4
. Financial globalization has not 
generated increased investment or higher growth in emerging economies. Economies that have 
grown most rapidly have been those that rely less on capital inflows. Financial globalization has 
felt short of smoothing consumption or/and reducing volatility. They further advocate that 
evidence based on financial globalization today is indirect, speculative and in their view: 
ultimately unpersuasive. According to them, it is time for a new paradigm on financial 
globalization and one that recognizes that more is not necessarily better
5
.  
                         
4
 This hypothesis is still object of hot debate. Leung (2003) has concluded that, increase in external debts flows in 
least developed countries is worsening business cycles. Kholdy & Sohrabian (2008)  establish that, FDI may jump-
start financial development in developing countries; especially in countries  which experience a higher level of 
corruption in the forms of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-favors”, secret party funding, 
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. At the industry level in some developing countries, 
liberalization has not been found to exert a significant impact on efficiency and productivity (Mulwa et al., 2009).  
5
 “As long as the world economy remains politically divided among different sovereign and regulatory authorities, 
global finance is condemned to suffer from deformation far worse than those of domestic finance. Depending on the 
context and country, the appropriate role of policy will be as often to stem the tide of capital flows as to encourage 
them. Policymakers who view their challenges exclusively from the latter perspective will get it badly wrong” 
(Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009, 16-17). 
 7 
 
3. Positioning of the current paper 
 
 Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the headlines, there was an emerging 
consensus among leading macroeconomists that it was time for developing countries to embrace 
the liberalization of their capital accounts (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). In a famous speech 
during the IMF’s Annual Meetings in 1997, Stanley Fischer presented the case for financial 
globalization and advocated an amendment to IMF’s articles, the object of which would allow 
the Fund to promote the orderly liberalization of capital movements (Fischer, 1997). There were 
risks associated with opening-up to capital accounts but Fischer was of the opinion that these 
could be offset by the potential benefits. Dornbusch (1996) who had advocated the usefulness of 
financial transactions taxes
6
 before Fischer (1997), declared capital controls “an idea whose time 
is past” and posited “the correct answer to the question of capital mobility is that it ought to be 
unrestricted” (Dornbusch, 1998, 20). After Fischer’s prophesy, there has been an explosion in 
empirical works on the consequences of financial globalization. However, far from clinching the 
case for capital account liberalization, these studies paint quite a paradoxical and mixed picture 
(Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). Perhaps the most detailed review of the literature conclude that, 
the cross-country evidence on the growth benefits of capital-account openness is inconclusive 
and lacks robustness (Kose et al., 2006).   
Kose et al. (2006) have surveyed an extensive literature and proposed an alternative 
framework for analyzing the macroeconomic implications of financial globalization in order to 
pull together existing strands and evidence. These authors postulate that, in theory financial 
globalization should catalyze domestic financial market development, improve corporate and 
                                                                               
 
6
 Such taxes according to Schmidt (2001) are more efficient than capital controls that are often relatively easy to 
evade, often complex and obscure, and supported by large corruptible bureaucracies.  
 8 
public governance, provide incentives for greater macroeconomic policy discipline. Such 
indirect benefits may be more important than the traditional financial channel emphasized in 
previous analyses. Findings from a much recent study inspired by the phenomenon of global 
current imbalances suggest that, developing countries that are more open to certain types of 
financial flows but overall are less reliant on foreign capital (and finance more of their 
investment through domestic savings) have on average experienced better growth performance 
(Kose et al., 2011). 
 A major debate however is that, there seem to be certain ‘threshold’ levels of financial 
and institutional developments that an economy needs to attain before it can get the full indirect 
benefits and reduce the risks of capital account liberalization. It has been generally framed that, 
industrial countries which typically have better institutions, more stable macroeconomic policies 
and deeper financial markets than developing countries have been the main beneficiaries of 
financial globalization. This has led many authors to argue that developing countries should 
focus on institutional capacity building and strengthening of their financial markets before 
opening-up their capital accounts (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). How to balance these 
considerations against the potential benefits to be gained from financial integration is a pressing 
policy question now that developing countries again are facing the difficult choices of whether 
and how to liberalize capital account transactions further.  
This paper contributes to existing literature by putting some empirical structure on the 
concept of financial threshold conditions in order to give policymakers guidance on the Kose et 
al. (2011)
7
 and Henry (2007)
8
 hypotheses. In framing the financial dimension in a more concrete 
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 “In this paper we develop a unified empirical framework for characterizing such threshold conditions. We find that 
there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality: the cost-
benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once these threshold conditions are satisfied” (Kose 
et al., 2011, p.1).  
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and tractable manner, we examine the concerns of how financial dynamic initial conditions of 
depth, efficiency, activity and size play out in the benefits of financial globalization. In plainer 
terms, we focus on the financial dimension of the ‘initial conditions’ debate and assess if the 
financial benefits of financial globalization are questionable until greater domestic financial 
development has taken place. In contrast to existing literature, this article introduces previously 
missing financial development components into the debate. We argue that, the concept of 
financial development should not be restricted to financial depth (deepening); as financial 
components of efficiency, activity and size have become increasingly relevant in the finance-
development nexus.  
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Data  
 
 We examine a sample of 15 African countries for the period 1996-2009 with data from 
African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank. Our restrictions to 15 countries and a 14 year time-span respectively 
are constrained by data availability and the focus on findings with updated policy implications. 
Summary statistics (Appendix 1), correlation analysis with presentation of countries (Appendix 
2) and variable definitions (Appendix 3) are detailed in the appendices.  
                                                                               
8
 “Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 1990s, a more calibrated 
approach has been followed in the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This 
approach is consistent with the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account 
liberalization for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging economies. Evidence suggests that the 
greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. Benefits 
resulting from external debt flows are questionable until greater domestic financial market development has taken 
place” (Henry, 2007). 
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 Financial intermediary dynamics include measures of depth (money supply)
9
, efficiency 
(banking system efficiency)
10
, activity (banking system activity)
11
 and size
12
. For robustness 
purposes, we use different measures of each financial intermediary dynamic. In accordance with 
mainstream literature (Henry, 2007; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009), financial globalization and 
trade liberalization are measured with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade openness 
respectively. Since the main focus of the paper is financial globalization, we use Private Capital 
Flows (PCF) as another measure of financial globalization for robustness checks.  Control 
variables include trade openness, economic prosperity (at macroeconomic and microeconomic 
levels), population growth, inflation, public investment and development assistance. These 
control variables have been substantially documented in the financial development literature 
(Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Saint Paul, 1992; Huyben & Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; 
                         
9
 Borrowing from the FDSD, this paper measures financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system 
perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. 
While the former denotes the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the later indicates liquid 
liabilities. Since we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, we distinguish liquid liabilities from money 
supply because a substantial chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector.  The two 
indicators are in ratios of GDP (see Appendix 3) and both can robustly cross-check each other as either account for 
over 98% of information in the other (see Appendix 2). 
 
10
 By financial intermediation efficiency here, this study neither refers to the profitability-oriented concept nor to the 
production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). 
What we seek to highlight is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming 
mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators (agents). We adopt proxies for banking-system-efficiency and 
financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits: Fcfd’). Like with financial depth, these two financial allocation efficiency proxies can 
cross-check each other as they represent more than 86% of variability in one another (see Appendix 2).  Locational 
choice of foreign direct investment is inter alia, determined by allocation efficiency (Chen, 1996).   
 
11 By financial intermediary activity here, the work highlights the ability of banks to grant credit to economic 
operators.  We proxy for both banking intermediary activity and financial intermediary activity with “private 
domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: 
Pcrbof” respectively. The later measure cross-checks the former as it represents more than 90% of information in 
the former (see Appendix 2). 
 
12
 With respect to the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of “deposit bank assets” to “total 
assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).  
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Huang, 2005, 2011; Do & Levchenko, 2004; Fielding, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005; Levine, 
1997, 2003, 2005; Aggarwal et al., 2011).  
 Some major national macroeconomic policies such as maintaining lower inflation and 
higher investment have been documented to be conducive to financial development (Huybens & 
Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Huang, 2011). Huybens & Smith (1999) theoretically and Boyd 
et al. (2001) empirically investigate the effects of inflation on financial development and find 
that economies with higher inflation rates are likely to have smaller, less active and less efficient 
banks (and equity markets). Huang (2011) empirically investigates the relation between 
investment and financial development and confirms a positive incidence of investment on 
financial development.  Some studies support the view that policies which encourage openness 
to external trade tend to boost financial development (Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 
2005). Many studies have also documented the positive link between growth and financial 
development. Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992) show that, as the economy 
grows, the cost of financial intermediation decreases because of intensive competition; inducing 
a larger scale of funds available for productive investment. The importance of income levels for 
financial development has been well addressed in Levine (1997, 2003, 2005). In taking into 
account banking sector development in transition economies, Jaffee & Levonian (2001) 
demonstrate that the level of GDP per capita has a positive effect on the banking system 
structure. Huang (2005) has established a positive link between population growths as a 
determinant of financial development. Like remittances (Aggarwal et al., 2011) foreign aid not 
tainted by corrupt practices and effectively used at the micro economic level could improve 
financial development.   
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4.2 Methodology  
 
Borrowing from Billger & Goel (2009), to determine if existing levels of financial 
development affect how financial globalization comes into play, we use quantile regression. This 
technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between each financial dynamic (depth, 
efficiency, activity and size) and the exogenous variables differ throughout the distribution of the 
dependent variable (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). The research question of this paper which is to 
assess if the financial benefits of financial globalization are questionable until greater domestic 
financial development has taken place, is compatible with the quantile estimation approach. 
Therefore, based on this technique we are able to carefully assess how financial globalization 
plays-out throughout the conditional distribution (with particular emphasis on countries with the 
highest and lowest levels of financial development). 
 Some studies on the determinants of financial development are based on Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation, which report parameter estimates at the conditional mean of the 
financial dependent variable. While mean effects are certainly important, one of the underlying 
assumptions of OLS regression is that the error term and the dependent variable are normally 
distributed. However, quantile regression does not require a normally distributed disturbance 
term. Quantile regression (QR) yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) and has gained attention in 
recent development literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012).  
 
The  th quantile estimator of the endogenous variable is obtained by solving for the 
following optimization problem. 
   






 
 







ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                         (1)
 
 
 13 
 
Where ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS which is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For instance the 10
th
 or 90
th
 
quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) by approximately weighing the residuals. The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is : 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                      (2) 
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th quantile of interest. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. For the model in Eq. (2), the 
dependent variable iy  is a financial development dynamic while ix  contains a constant term, 
GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, population growth, inflation, public investment and 
development assistance. The quantile estimation technique is more robust than the OLS approach 
in the presence of outliers when the distribution of the dependent variable is a highly non-normal 
pattern (Okada & Samreth, 2012).  We also report results for Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) 
which should correspond to those of the 0.5
th
 quantile.  
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1 Summary of findings  
 
The results presented in Tables 1-4 include OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate 
quantiles in the conditional distributions of the dependent variable. In the interpretation of 
estimated coefficients, note should be taken of the fact that smaller values (in conditional 
distributions) of the dependent variable denote less financial development. Table 1, Table 2, 
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Table 3 and, Table 4 show the results for financial depth, financial efficiency, financial activity 
and financial size respectively.  
The use of two specifications with different control variables is consistent with recent 
‘quantile regression’-oriented threshold literature. Okada & Samreth (2012, p. 242) have used 
several specifications, Asongu (2013a) has used five, Billger, & Goel, (2009, p. 302) have used 
three while Asongu (2013b) has used two. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of Financial Depth: OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions  
 Dependent variable: Economic Financial Depth (Money Supply :M2) 
 OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Specification 1 
Constant 1.019*** 1.169*** 0.610*** 1.048*** 1.169*** 1.341*** 1.498*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001 0.002 0.013*** 
 (0.503) (0.629) (0.046) (0.001) (0.625) (0.382) (0.000) 
Trade   0.0006 -0.0003 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0006*** 
 (0.126) (0.630) (0.850) (0.400) (0.534) (0.017) (0.005) 
Economic Prosperity  0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004* -0.006*** 
 (0.742) (0.986) (0.364) (0.296) (0.985) (0.092) (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.088) (0.952) (0.603) (0.401) (0.590) (0.339) (0.010) 
Population growth  -0.279*** -0.313*** -0.157*** -0.302*** -0.313*** -0.329*** -0.369*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations   210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
 
 Specification 2 
Constant 0.283*** 0.180*** 0.239*** 0.190*** 0.180*** 0.233*** 0.487*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.004 -0.003 -0.002** -0.008*** -0.003 0.008* 0.008 
 (0.243) (0.657) (0.019) (0.000) (0.166) (0.073) (0.253) 
Trade   0.002*** 0.002*** -0.0003** 0.0003 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Per capita Economic Prosperity  -0.000 0.010 -0.006*** -0.003 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.009 
 (0.993) (0.196) (0.000) (0.148) (0.000) (0.001) (0.302) 
Public Investment   0.019*** 0.025*** 0.006*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.033*** 0.019* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) 
Development Assistance  -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
        
Notes.  Dependent variable is the financial depth  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 
0.1) signify nations where  financial depth  is least. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations.  
 
 
The findings in Table 1 do not confirm the research hypothesis, implying the financial 
depth benefits of financial globalization are not necessarily contingent on domestic financial 
depth attaining a certain threshold. This result is consistent across specifications. Most control 
variables are broadly significant with the right signs. For instance, public investment (foreign-
 15 
aid) increases (decreases) financial depth (or economic growth): broadly consistent with recent 
African growth literature (Asongu, 2012a). Ultimately, the research hypothesis is not validated 
with respect to financial depth: contrary to Kose et al. (2011) and Henry (2007). A down-to-earth 
elucidation of this finding does not reflect the benefits from financial liberalization for countries 
with high levels of domestic savings (deposits) in the globalization process.  
Based on the results in Table 2, the research hypothesis is not valid for financial 
intermediary efficiency. This is true across specifications and implies, the allocation efficiency 
benefits of financial liberalization are not contingent on existing levels of domestic financial 
intermediary development efficiency. The negative effect of financial liberalization on financial 
efficiency is consistent with recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2012b).  
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Financial Efficiency: OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions  
 Dependent variable: Banking System Efficiency (Bank credit on Bank deposits)  
 OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Specification 1 
Constant 1.116*** 1.054*** 0.771*** 1.062*** 1.054*** 1.238*** 1.603*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.013*** -0.012** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) 
Trade   -0.001*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.245) (0.004) (0.007) (0.135) (0.100) (0.234) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.0006 -0.003 -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.913) (0.489) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.294) (0.914) (0.973) (0.739) (0.319) (0.203) (0.304) 
Population growth  -0.071*** -0.072** -0.064* -0.139*** -0.072** -0.078*** -0.145*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.053) (0.000) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) 
Observations   210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
 
 Specification 2 
Constant 1.022*** 0.935*** 0.688*** 0.874*** 0.935*** 1.187*** 1.488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.009* 0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.068) 
Trade   -0.001*** -0.0005 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.460) (0.000) (0.000) (0.339) (0.048) (0.000) 
Per capita Economic Prosperity  -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.002 -0.011** -0.022*** -0.013** -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.752) (0.012) (0.000) (0.041) (0.131) 
Public Investment   -0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.014** -0.007 
 (0.365) (0.440) (0.512) (0.474) (0.250) (0.037) (0.242) 
Development Assistance  -0.011**** -0.007** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.006* -0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.062) (0.000) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
        
Notes.  Dependent variable is financial efficiency  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 
0.1) signify nations where  financial efficiency  is least.  P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations.  
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Findings in Table 3 relative to financial activity do not confirm the research hypothesis 
too. This assertion is valid across specifications and the negative sign implies financial 
globalization decreases the amount of private credit allocated to economic operators (or agents) 
by domestic banks. A logical explanation for this negative relationship is that, with financial 
globalization foreign banks have a comparative advantage in the service sector, thus decreasing 
the proportion of private credit from domestic banks (Asongu, 2012b). 
 
Table 3: Determinants of Financial Activity: OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions  
 Dependent variable: Banking System Activity (Private credit from deposit banks)  
 OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Specification 1 
Constant 0.890*** 0.881*** 0.257*** 0.768*** 0.881*** 1.016*** 1.069*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.002 -0.003 -0.004*** -0.004** -0.003* -0.003 -0.004*** 
 (0.233) (0.184) (0.000) (0.026) (0.100) (0.182) (0.004) 
Trade   -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.0008** -0.0009** -0.0004** 
 (0.000) (0.158) (0.147) (0.000) (0.017) (0.011) (0.039) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.005* -0.011*** 
 (0.483) (0.168) (0.254) (0.652) (0.191) (0.078) (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.977) (0.979) (0.740) (0.845) (0.775) (0.570) (0.113) 
Population growth  -0.223*** -0.235*** -0.060*** -0.213*** -0.235*** -0.258*** -0.252*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations   210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
 
 Specification 2 
Constant 0.352*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.164*** 0.366*** 0.591*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.003 -0.006 -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007** -0.003 
 (0.247) (0.217) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.046) (0.196) 
Trade   -0.000 0.000 -0.0003*** -0.0002 0.0006*** 0.0007 0.001*** 
 (0.413) (0.184) (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) 
Per capita Economic Prosperity  -0.000 0.003 -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.003* 0.010** 0.002 
 (0.906) (0.448) (0.000) (0.002) (0.050) (0.019) (0.324) 
Public Investment   0.010*** 0.018*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.015*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.519) 
Development Assistance  -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
        
Notes.  Dependent variable is financial activity  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 
0.1) signify nations where financial activity is least. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations.  
 
Table 4 results appear to validate the research hypothesis. Though the effect of financial 
liberalization bears a negative relationship with domestic financial system size, the negative 
effect appears to decrease across the distributions (from lower to higher quantiles): consistent 
across specifications. Therefore, domestic financial system size matters in the benefits of 
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financial globalization; as the negative magnitude is more pronounced in countries with smaller 
financial sizes (lower quantiles).  
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Financial Size: OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions  
 Dependent variable: Financial Size 
 OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Specification 1 
Constant 0.965*** 1.026*** 0.961*** 0.918*** 1.026*** 1.051*** 1.056*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.032*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) 
Trade   0.0004 0.0001 -0.000 0.0009*** 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*** 
 (0.301) (0.653) (0.931) (0.005) (0.651) (0.542) (0.000) 
Economic Prosperity  0.003 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.370) (0.367) (0.197) (0.273) (0.323) (0.585) (0.478) 
Inflation  -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.023) (0.869) (0.806) (0.016) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population growth  -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.169*** -0.101*** -0.079*** -0.040*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations   210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
 
 Specification 2 
Constant 0.809*** 0.894*** 0.810*** 0.823*** 0.894*** 0.960*** 0.988*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.011*** -0.006 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.006** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.315) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade   0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.000 -0.0001 
 (0.128) (0.753) (0.333) (0.283) (0.591) (0.845) (0.272) 
Per capita Economic Prosperity  0.002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 0.001 
 (0.452) (0.937) (0.954) (0.891) (0.920) (0.785) (0.329) 
Public Investment   0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.0003 -0.001 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.634) (0.810) (0.301) (0.946) (0.722) (0.271) (0.087) 
Development Assistance  -0.005*** -0.004 -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.004** -0.002*** 0.0002 
 (0.005) (0.389) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.004) (0.681) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Notes.  Dependent variable is the financial size  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 
0.1) signify nations where financial size is least. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations.  
 
 
 
5.2 Robustness checks  
 Robustness checks are performed at two levels. On the one hand, we use different proxies 
for financial development; on the other hand, since the main focus of the paper is financial 
globalization, we also use private capital flows as an alternative measure of financial 
globalization to check the consistency of the FDI-based findings. The second sets of regressions 
do not validate the hypothesis under investigation for financial development dimensions of depth 
(liquid liabilities), efficiency (financial system credit on financial system deposits) and activity 
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(private domestic credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions). However, findings 
for financial size (based on private capital flows) validate the hypothesis; consistent with the 
FDI-based regressions. Due to space constraints we report only the findings for financial size in 
Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5: Determinants of Financial Size: OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions  
 Financial Size 
 OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
 Specification 1 
Constant 0.986*** 1.038*** 0.982*** 0.972*** 1.038*** 1.072*** 1.047*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Capital Flows   -0.010*** -0.008** -0.023** -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade   0.0002 0.000 -0.0003 0.0006 0.000 -0.0003* -0.0003*** 
 (0.537) (0.820) (0.852) (0.111) (0.829) (0.052) (0.000) 
Economic Prosperity  0.003 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.0001 -0.0007* 
 (0.395) (0.378) (0.368) (0.678) (0.396) (0.930) (0.074) 
Inflation  -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000* -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.028) (0.882) (0.883) (0.074) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population growth  -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.180** -0.113*** -0.083** -0.047*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations   210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
 
 Specification 2 
Constant 0.818*** 0.906*** 0.785*** 0.866*** 0.906*** 0.979*** 1.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private  Capital Flows   -0.009*** -0.003 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.003 -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.492) (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade   0.0004 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004*** 
 (0.262) (0.677) (0.342) (0.278) (0.603) (0.423) (0.000) 
Per capita Economic Prosperity  0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.454) (0.542) (0.578) (0.619) (0.520) (0.897) (0.479) 
Public Investment   0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.578) (0.708) (0.661) (0.367) (0.640) (0.102) (0.000) 
Development Assistance  -0.006*** -0.007 -0.028*** -0.018*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.026) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Notes.  Dependent variable is the financial size  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 
0.1) signify nations where  financial size  is least. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations 
 
   
5.3 Discussion and policy recommendations  
 
Before delving into the discussion of financial development thresholds, it is imperative to 
reconsider the intuition and hypothesis motivating this study. A hotly debated issue in the 
globalization literature is that, there seem to be certain ‘threshold’ levels of financial and 
institutional developments that an economy needs to attain before it can get full benefits and 
reduce the risks of capital account liberalization. It has generally been framed that industrial 
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countries which typically have better institutions, more stable macroeconomic policies and 
deeper financial markets than developing countries have been the main beneficiaries of financial 
globalization. This has led many authors to argue that developing countries should focus on 
institutional capacity building and strengthening of their financial markers before opening-up 
their capital accounts (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). How to balance these considerations 
against the potential benefits to be gained from financial integration is a pressing policy question 
now that developing countries again are facing the difficult choices of whether and how to 
liberalize capital account transactions further.  
 
5.3.1 Higher initial levels of financial depth are not instrumental in financial globalization 
 
 Kose et al. (2011) find identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and 
institutional quality in the cost-benefit trade-off from financial openness and postulate: financial 
benefits of globalization are substantial once these threshold conditions are satisfied (Kose et al., 
2011, 1). This positioning in threshold requirements had earlier been emphasized by Henry 
(2007) who elucidated why the Indian current account was being opened in a calibrated 
manner
13
. Our results have not significantly confirmed this hypothesis from two main 
dimensions: financial depth from an overall economic standpoint (money supply) and financial 
deepening from a financial system perspective (deposits or liquid liabilities).  
 The relevance of existing levels of deposits (financial depth) points to the importance of 
the level of domestic savings in the financial globalization process. High domestic savings do not 
                         
13
 “Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 1990s, a more calibrated 
approach has been followed in the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This 
approach is consistent with the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account 
liberalization for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging economies. Evidence suggests that the 
greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. Benefits 
resulting from external debt flows are questionable until greater domestic financial market development has taken 
place (Henry, 2007)”. 
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only improve financial depth upon globalization; they also serve as a cushion to external 
financial shocks in periods of financial crisis. According to Rodrik & Subramanian (2009), 
economies that have grown more rapidly in terms of investment and growth on the one hand, and 
affected less by global financial crises on the other hand, are those that rely less on capital 
inflows. This implies, economies that have a solid domestic savings base before opening up their 
capital accounts will benefit more from financial openness. However, this is only vaguely 
indicated in our findings.  
If the hypothesis of consistency in positive change of magnitude across quantiles is 
relaxed, then it could also be concluded that, compared with countries of lower initial financial 
depth, countries with higher levels of financial depth enjoy higher benefits in terms of increased 
circulation of currency, with financial globalization. This is only a partial validation of the Kose 
et al. (2011) and Henry (2007) hypotheses. The positive incidence of financial globalization in 
higher quantiles has two implications: (1) it indicates an extensive use of currency which reflects 
a strengthening of economic activity and; (2) the extensive use of currency may either be the 
product of increased formal banking sector deposits or the effect of growth in non-formal and 
informal financial sector activities. The premise of this interpretation is that, unlike in the 
developed world, in developing countries, the informal financial sector has a substantial 
competitive advantage in financial sector competition. For example, fresh African finance 
literature has established that the burgeoning phenomenon of mobile banking, while negatively 
correlated with the formal financial sector, is positively correlated with the informal financial 
sector (Asongu, 2012c). This indicates that, FDI which targets mobile banking activities could 
result in an extensive use of currency that is not necessarily captured by the formal banking 
sector.  
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5.3.2 Existing levels of financial efficiency and activity do not matter in financial globalization 
 
 In the neoclassical models, liberalizing the capital accounts eases a more efficient 
international allocation of resources and produces all kinds of salubrious effects. Resources flow 
from capital abundant developed countries where the return of capital is low, to capital-scarce 
developing countries where the return of capital high. The flow of resources into developing 
countries reduces the cost of capital, triggering a temporal increase in investment and growth that 
permanently raises living standards (Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 
2000).  
While our analysis does not seek to confirm or refute whether higher levels of allocation 
efficiency and ‘finance availability to economic agents’ are characteristics of financial 
globalization, our findings however show that globalization substantially reduces the amount of 
deposits allocated to economic agents by domestic financial institutions. With this reduction in 
the amount of private domestic credit in proportion of deposit (savings), the surplus-liquidity 
problem is generated. The negative relationship with financial intermediary activity (or credit) 
confirms the heavy reliance on foreign credit (upon financial liberalization); as opposed to 
private domestic credit. From a ‘comparative advantage’ standpoint, these findings which are 
broadly consistent with recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2012b), confirm the relative 
lack of a comparative advantage in the service (bank) sector (by African financial institutions). 
This finding is consistent with the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in African 
financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). The presence of surplus liquidity is an 
indication of financial intermediary allocation inefficiency and ultimately, a decrease in financial 
activity.  
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This assertion subscribes to the alternative strand of the globalization debate which views 
allocation efficiency as a fanciful attempt to extend the results on the gains from international 
trade in goods to international trade in assets. The predictions of allocation efficiency stand 
ground only when the economy suffers from no distortions other than barriers to free capital 
flows. This further highlights the skeptics’ view that, owing to many distortions in developing 
countries the theoretical predictions of the neoclassical model bear little resemblance to the 
reality of capital account policy.  
  
5.3.3 Existing levels of financial size count in financial liberalization 
 
 Financial intermediary size according to our definition reflects the ratio of deposit bank 
assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. From our findings, the negative incidence 
of financial globalization appears to be decreasing across the distribution. That is, the negative 
magnitude decreases as one move from lower to higher quantiles of the distribution. Thus, 
countries with high initial financial size are more prone to have a less negative effect from 
capital account openness. This finding could best be explained from Henry (2007) where-in, 
capital account openness must be well calibrated and opened only in tandem with available 
empirical evidence on domestic financial (size) development.  
 A down to earth elucidation of this finding implies, the decreasing negative threshold 
effect could become positive if the surplus liquidity issues of African banks are addressed. 
Accordingly, an increase in banking sector assets (credit) will have a positive bearing on 
financial size (deposit bank assets/ total assets (deposit bank assets + central bank assets)). This 
interpretation unites the discussions on financial dynamics of efficiency and activity above. 
Hence, tackling the issue of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions could improve the 
benefits of financial size and potentially reverse the trends of financial efficiency and activity 
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5. 3.4 On the control variables 
  
We now devote space to discussing the control variables. But for public investment in the 
second specification of most tables, determinants of financial development used as control 
variables have a negative relationship with financial development. The following could be 
retained for other determinants of financial development we have controlled for. (1) On the 
effect of inflation and public investment, major national macroeconomic policies maintaining 
lower inflation and higher investment are conducive to financial development (Huybens & 
Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Huang, 2011). But for the financial efficiency regressions, while 
public investment has a positive incidence on financial development, inflation instead has the 
opposite effect. The explanation of the detrimental character of inflation is straight forward: 
inflation is too high (more than 32% in the mean from Appendix 1).  (1) Economic prosperity (at 
macro and microeconomic levels) was expected to improve financial development (Greenwood 
& Jovanovic, 1990; Saint-Paul, 1992). The incidence of growth is mixed at best: positive in 
some thresholds, negative in some and insignificant in others. The insignificance of the 
relationship in most cases could be explained from the manner in which income-levels matter in 
financial development (Levine, 1997, 2003, 2005). Economic prosperity that doesn’t trickle 
down to per capita income growth does not amount to any significant change in income-levels. 
In certain cases, when fruits of economic prosperity are siphoned and deposited in foreign 
accounts, economic prosperity may not translate into financial development through the wealth-
effect. (3) Some studies support the stance that, policies which encourage openness to external 
trade tend to boost financial development (Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005). 
The negative incidence of trade openness (for the most part) is consistent with recent African 
growth literature (Asongu, 2012b). Foreign financial institutions naturally have a higher 
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competitive advantage in the service sector. (4) Contrary to Huang (2005)
14
, we argue from our 
findings that, population growth that is not accompanied by corresponding policies which 
encourage the creation of bank accounts may have a negative or insignificant incidence on 
financial development.  (5) Like in the effects on formal institutions (Asongu, 2012a) and  
economic prosperity (Asongu, 2012b) documented in recent African development literature, if 
foreign-aid is not well managed, it could be detrimental to financial intermediary development.  
 
5.3.5 Specific policy recommendations  
  
 Four main specific policy implications have resulted from the findings: addressing the 
issue of surplus liquidity; the need for financial development policies to be contingent on 
financial dynamics; opening-up of the capital account in tandem with the weight of available 
evidence on the effect of financial globalization on domestic financial development and; 
calibrating the neglected informal financial sector that is substantially contributing to financial 
system assets. 
 Firstly, as outlined above, a common policy that could potentially improve financial 
dynamics of efficiency, activity and size is the tackling of the surplus liquidity problem in 
African financial institutions. In the face of capital account openness, the following measures 
could be implemented to address the issue. (1) Voluntary holding of excess liquidity could be 
mitigated by:  reinforcement of institutions that would favor interbank lending so as to ease 
borrowing between banks for contingency purposes; easing difficulties encountered by banks in 
tracking their positions at the central bank that may require them to hold reserves above the 
statutory limits and; improve infrastructure so that remote bank branches may not need to hold 
excess reserves due to transportation problems. (2) Involuntary holding of excess liquidity could 
                         
14
 In whose study population growth has a positive effect on financial development.  
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also be avoided by: decreasing the inability of banks to lend, especially in situations where 
interest rates are regulated
15
; stifling the unwillingness of banks to expand lending by reducing 
asymmetric information and lack of competition; creating conditions to sustain the spread 
between bonds and reserves so that, commercial banks can invest excess liquidity in the bond 
markets and; developing regional stock exchange markets to  broaden investment opportunities 
for commercial banks.  
 Secondly, capital control policies targeting financial development should not be blanket, 
but contingent on the prevailing dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. Contrary to 
mainstream literature, we have used all the four dimensions identified in the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. Hence, we have been able to 
establish that mixing-up these concepts could seriously limit the effectiveness of financial 
development policies.  
 Thirdly, the decision on whether to completely open the capital account should depend 
on the available weight of evidence on the effect of financial globalization on financial 
development dynamics. Accordingly, based on our findings, it will be grossly unwise to treat 
countries with low initial levels in financial development dynamics in the same manner as their 
counterparts with high existing levels. Put in plainer terms, the state of development in a given 
financial development dynamic must be taken into account in the capital account openness 
decision making process.  
 Fourthly, integrating financial assets of the informal financial sector in the conception 
and definition of the financial system and correspondingly in the appreciation of indicators 
proposed by the FDSD could substantially contribute to the financial development threshold 
                         
15
 For instance this is the case of  the CEMAC region where the central bank sets a floor for lending rates and a  
ceiling for deposit rates above and below which interest rates are negotiated freely.  
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literature. The premise for this implication is that, the previously missing informal financial 
sector component in the financial system definition (by the FDSD) has a substantial financial 
sector competitive advantage in mobile banking (Asongu, 2012c).  
 
5.3.6 Broad policy recommendations  
 
 The Fischer (1997) prophesy on financial globalization and the Dornbusch (1996) 
declaration that ‘capital-controls is an idea of the past’ are not broadly justified in terms of   
financial development benefits to undeveloped countries. This reflects the need for an orderly 
and well calibrated liberalization of capital movements as were enshrined in the IMF articles 
before Fischer (1997). Therefore, the decision to move from a closed account regime (where 
capital may not move freely in and out of the country) and liberalize capital accounts (in which 
capital can enter and leave at will), should depend on country-specific macroeconomic financial 
fundamentals and not based on common-blanked policies. These broadly mean that, if the 
targeted interest of financial liberalization is directly or indirectly linked to financial 
development, some initial levels (thresholds) in financial size are important to discount targeted 
benefits. 
 Accordingly, based on the weight of above empirical evidence, the theoretical predictions 
of the neoclassical model bear little resemblance with the reality of capital account policy.  Thus, 
financial benefits of open capital account are not really apparent (if they indirectly exist for 
domestic financial depth, efficiency and activity). Domestic financial depth, activity and 
efficiency rewards of financial globalization may hence be indirect or purely speculative. It is 
therefore time for a new paradigm of globalization, one that recognizes all dynamics of financial 
intermediary development in the financial benefits of financial liberalization. Depending on the 
context of sampled countries, the appropriate role of policy has always been either to stem the 
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tide of capital flows or encourage them. Policymakers who have been viewing their challenges 
exclusively from the latter perspective for benefits in development might be getting the financial 
dynamics badly wrong.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The issue of which financial initial conditions are necessary to materialize the benefits of 
financial globalization remains open to debate in the literature. With the recent financial crisis, 
developing countries are facing the difficult choices of whether and how to liberalize their 
capital accounts further. In response to the pressing policy questions about the potential benefits 
to be gained from financial integration, this paper has contributed to existing literature by putting 
some empirical structure on the concept of financial threshold conditions in order to give 
policymakers guidance on the Kose et al. (2011) and Henry (2007) hypotheses.  
In framing the financial issue in a more concrete and tractable manner, we have  assessed 
the concerns of how dynamic financial initial conditions of depth, efficiency, activity and size 
play out in the benefits of financial globalization. In plainer terms, we have assessed if the 
financial benefits of financial globalization are questionable until greater domestic financial 
development have taken place. The following findings have been established: (1) only financial 
initial (threshold) conditions of size are necessary to materialize the benefits of financial 
globalization and; (2) while financial depth only partially validates the hypothesis, dynamics of 
efficiency and activity (credit) do not confirm the hypothesis.  
As a policy implication, addressing the issue of surplus liquidity in African financial 
institutions could improve the benefits of financial size and potentially reverse the trends of 
financial efficiency and activity. Depending on the context of sampled countries, the appropriate 
role of policy has always been either to stem the tide of capital flows or encourage them. 
 28 
Policymakers who have been viewing their challenges exclusively from the latter perspective for 
benefits in growth might be getting the financial dynamics badly wrong.   
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
 Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 0.446 0.290 0.102 1.279 210 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  0.383 0.267 0.054 1.054 210 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  0.676 0.270 0.133 1.400 210 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 0.753 0.501 0.137 2.606 210 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 0.260 0.212 0.011 0.869 210 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 0.309 0.327 0.011 1.739 210 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 0.789 0.208 0.110 1.052 210 
       
Globalization  
 
Financial Openness (FDI) 3.996 5.340 -4.972 40.157 210 
Private Capital Flows (PCF) 4.082 5.755 -9.108 40.157 210 
Trade Openness (Trade) 77.636 40.871 30.044 255.01 210 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 5.018 3.719 -7.617 20.613 210 
Per capita Economic Prosperity(GDPpcg) 2.738 3.568 -8.684 17.114 210 
Population Growth 2.208 0.799 -1.081 3.389 210 
Inflation 32.832 287.29 -2.477 4145.1 210 
Public Investment 7.016 3.725 1.369 25.008 210 
Development Assistance  7.915 7.735 -0.251 52.823 210 
       
 Panel B: Presentation of Countries  
                        Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.  
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        Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
Financial  Development Dynamics Globalization Flows Control Variables  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size          
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba FDIgdp PCFgdp Trade GDPg GDPpcg Popg Inflation PubIvt NODA  
1.000 0.981 0.039 0.040 0.719 0.496 0.342 0.059 0.099 0.418 -0.183 -0.006 -0.809 -0.106 0.107 -0.442 M2 
 1.000 0.092 0.148 0.785 0.608 0364 0.063 0.105 0.429 -0.187 -0.002 -0.844 -0.110 0.113 -0.456 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.860 0.583 0.644 0.505 -0.388 -0.350 -0.304 -0.262 -0.239 -0.129 -0.160 -0.261 -0.320 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.622 0.837 0.404 -0.299 -0.227 -0.249 -0.213 -0.175 -0.190 -0.096 -0.246 -0.325 FcFd 
    1.000 0.907 0.503 -0.162 -0.115 0.071 -0.208 -0.054 -0.708 -0.108 -0.049 -0.493 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.446 -0.160 -0.089 0.005 -0.203 -0.078 -0.577 -0.084 -0.119 -0.460 Pcrbof 
      1.000 -0.251 -0.234 0.042 -0.024 0.038 -0.324 -0.158 -0.056 -0.271 Dbacba 
       1.000 0.932 0.527 -0.047 -0.035 -0.064 0.040 0.091 0.103 FDIgdp 
        1.000 0.487 -0.069 -0.051 -0.086 0.033 0.083 0.086 PCFgdp 
         1.000 -0.074 0.024 -0.468 0.162 0.087 -0.289 Trade 
          1.000 0.973 0.239 0.117 0.171 0.233 GDPg 
           1.000 0.020 0.104 0.184 0.144 GDPpcg 
            1.000 0.064 -0.050 0.415 Popg 
             1.000 -0.039 -0.018 Inflation 
              1.000 0.379 PubIvt. 
               1.000 NODA 
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  
          Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. FDI: Foreign Direct  
          Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows.  GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial openness  1 FDI Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial openness  2 PCF  Private Capital Flows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Average annual population growth rate  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Per Capita Economic 
prosperity  
GDPpcg GDP per capita Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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